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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The insurer probably could have avoided the result of the instant
decision by inserting in its policy a "no action" clauseF The courts
generally hold that such a clause forbids joinder of the insurer in a
suit against the insured;' and only a specific statute enabling joinder
of the insurer will override such a clause within a policy."
The case appears to be one of first impression in North Dakota,
although three other cases have been found which consider the related
question of the propriety of informing jurors that the defendant has in-
surance, when no insurer is a party to the record. A careful study
of these cases' indicates that the North Dakota Supreme Court recog-
nizes the prejudicial effect of such information where it is injected
for no purpose other than to encourage a larger verdict against the
defendant; but these cases in no way deny the right to join an insur-
ance company as defendant where a direct cause of action exists
against that company under a reasonable construction of our plead-
- ing statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALIEN LAND LAws-
EFFECT OF UNrIED NATIONS cHAs -xs. The California Alien Land Law'
prohibits, except as prescribed by treaty, the ownership of agricultural
land' by aliens ineligible to citizenship, and provides for the escheat
17 A "no action'- clause provides that no action can be brought against the in-
surer until the liability of the insured is first determined by judgment against him.
It is designed to keep the-fact of insurance out of a jury trial. See Morgan v. Hunt,
196 Wis. 298, 220 N. W. 224 (1928); Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, §
4861 (1942)..
" Stearns v. Graves, 61 Idaho 282, 99 P. 2d 955, 958 (1940). See, holding that
a "no action" clause forbids joinder of an insurer even where the policy is writ-
ten under a compulsory insurance statute: Pageway Coaches v. Bransford, 71 S. W.
2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd 129 Tex. 327, 104 S. W. 2d 471 (1937); Polzin
v. Wachtl, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N. W. 182 (1932); cf. Milliron v. Dittman, 180 Cal
443, 181 Pac. 779 (1919). Contra: Thompson v. Bass, 167 S. C. 845, 166 S. E. 346
(1932).
19 Compare Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 233 N. W. 572 (1930), with
Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N. W. 461 (1933).
'2 Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 N. D. 373, 168 N. W. 791 (1918) (holding it is
within discretion of trial court to declare mistrial if plaintiff so questions witness
that jurors learn that defendant is insured); Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N. D. 708,
193 N. W. 312 (1923) (holding trial court must declare mistrial upon defendant's
motion, if plaintiff so questions witness that jurors learn that defendant is insured);
Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N. D. 27, 268 N. W. 873 (1936) (holding that where defen-
dant has sought to impeach credibility of plaintiff's witness, plaintiff can by his
witness bri'": out the fact of insurance when necessary to explain the impeaching
matter; defendant in effect invited plaintiff to put in prejudicial matter of Insur-
ance).
1 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, Supp. 1945). In North Dakota
aliens are authorized by N. D. Rev. Code §§ 47-0111 and 56-0116 (1943) to ac-
quire and dispose of land as if they were citizens.
I Although the prohibition refers to all "real property" it actually applies
only to agricultural land, because of a commercial treaty between the United
States and Japan, 37 Stat. 1504 (1911), authorizing citizens of Japan "to lease
land for residential and commercial purposes. . ." Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U. S. 123
(1928).
RECENT CASES
of any agricultural land acquired by such an alien in violation of the
law with intent to evade the law, this intent being presumed when-
ever an ineligible alien pays the consideration for a transfer to a citi-
zen or an eligible alien.'
Sei Fujii, a Japanese alien ineligible to citizenship,' acquired land
by deed in July, 1948. He brought action against the State of Cali-
fornia to determine whether the land had escheated. From a judg-
ment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, that the land
had escheated to the state on the date of the deed, the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The District Court of Appeal, unanimously reversing judg-
ment, held that the Alien Land Law is unenforceable because it is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter,
which as a treaty ratified by the United States became the supreme
law of the land.' "The Alien Land Law must therefore yield to the
treaty as the superior authority." Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P. 2d 481 (Cal.
App. 1950). On rehearing,' the court held that the fact that Japan
is not a member of the United Nations does not render its nationals
ineligible to the Charter guarantee under Article 55(c) of equal
rights to all "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion."'
Until recent years, the constitutionality of state alien land laws
has been unsuccessfully challenged in the Supreme Court of the
United States and in state appellate courts.' The argument has been
that a state, under its police power to promote the peace and general
welfare of its citizens, can determine whether or not aliens shall own
agricultural land; subject, of course, to constitutional limitations., In
the absence of treaty and congressional action regulating alien land
ownership, the principal obstacle to state discrimination against
aliens is the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state
shall deprive "any person" of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny "any person" the equal protection of the law."
1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 §§ 1, 2, 7, 9, and 9(a) (Deering 1944, Supp. 1945).
54 Stat. 1140, 8 U. S. C. § 703 (1946). A "person of the Japanese race, if
not born a citizen, is ineligible to become a citizen, i. e., to be naturalized." Morrison
v. California, 291 U. S. 82, 85 (1934).
5 U. S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the
Charter was ratified as a treaty by the President on August 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031
(1945).
218 P. 2d 595 (Cal. App. 1950).
59 Stat. 1045-46 (1945). Compare Charter Articles 1 (3), 59 Stat. 1037
(1945), and 13(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1039 (1945).
" See e. g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); Cockrill v. California,
268 U.S. 258 (1924); People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 286 Pac. 1025 (1930); In re
FuJimoto's Guardianship, 130 Wash. 188, 226 Pac. 505 (1924). But see Applegate
v. Luke, 173 Ark. 93, 291, S.W. 978 (1927), where the Arkansas Alien Land Law
was held unconstitutional as a violation of the state constitution.
' Rottschaefer, American Constitutional Law 520 (1939).
" U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. For arguments that state alien land laws
are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Ferguson, The California
Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 61 (1947); Me-
Govney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 Calif.
L. Rev. 7 (1947).
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"Any person" includes aliens.' Another obstacle, largely ignored, is
the provision of § 41 of the Civil Rights Act that "all persons" in the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have "the full and equal
benefit of all laws" as is enjoyed by citizens, and shall be subject to
the same liabilities " of every kind, and to no other."' "All persons"
also includes aliens. ' A third obstacle, largely unrealized, is that
state discrimination against aliens interferes with the exclusive pow-
ers of the federal government respecting foreign affairs.' Such state
discrimination has created serious conflict between the United
States and the foreign homeland of the aliens.15 When California en-
acted its Alien Land Law in 1913, after years of political agitation
arising from racial prejudice and from intense competition between
citizen and alien for land and employment, the reaction in Japan
was a violent anti-American feeling which almost resulted in war
between Japan and the United States.' If war had resulted, not
California alone, but the whole nation would have suffered ." "Le-
gal imposition of distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and
obligations upon aliens.. .thus bears an inseparable relationship to
the welfare and tranquillity of all the states, and not merely to the
welfare and tranquillity of one."'
Nonetheless, state alien land laws have been sustained by the
United States Supreme Court for over a quarter of a century," on
the sole ground that they were a valid exercise of state police pow-
er consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment."
But recent decisions indicate that the Court has revised its atti-
tude as to state laws discriminating against resident aliens. In
" Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
" 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 8 U.S. C. § 41 (1946).
13 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
4 Note, Conflict Between Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding Re-
strictions, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (1949); cf. Donelson, Federal Supremacy
and the Davidowitz Case, 29 (eo. L. J. 755, 758-59 (1941).
15 Note, Conflict Between Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding Re-
strictions, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (1949).
is See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 655-56 (1948) (concurring opinion);
McWilliams, Prejudice 46 (1944).
17 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1879); Note, Conflict Between
Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding Restrictions, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
315, 322 (1949).
Hines v Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52, 65-66 (1941).
In a series of decisions by Mr. Justice Butler: Terrace v Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 ( j23), sustaining the Washington Alien Land Law prohibiting owner-
ship of agricultural land by nondeclarant or inelgible aliens; Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923), sustaining the California law prohibiting ownership of agri-
cultural land by ineligible aliens; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923), sustain-
ing a provision of the California law prohibiting share-cropping agreements with
ineligible aliens; Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923), sustaining a provision of
the California law prohibiting the sale of shares of stock in agricultural corpora-
tions to ineligible aliens; Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258 (1924), sustaining
a provision of the California law creating a presumption of intent to evade the law
whenever an ineligible alien paid the consideration for a transfer to a citizen or an
eligible alien.
20 Rottschaefer, American Constitutional Law 520 (1939).
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Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission" the Court declared that a
California statute, prohibiting the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to aliens ineligible to citizenship, was unconstitutional be-
cause it denied such aliens the equal protection of the law, in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 41 of the Civil Rights
Act. "The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its
authority. .. embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this
country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges
with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws. ' ' "
Perhaps more significant is the recent decision of the Court in
Oyama v. California." In this case a Japanese alien ineligible to citi-
zenship paid the consideration for a transfer of agricultural land to
his son, a citizen by birth." The State of California obtained a judg-
ment declaring an escheat of the land, on the ground that it had
been transferred with an intent to violate and evade the Alien Land
Law. On certiorari, the Supreme 0Court of the United States, re-
versing judgment in a 5-3 decision, held that the section of the Alien
Land Law creating the presumption of the intent to violate the law
whenever an ineligible alien pays the consideration for a transfer
to a citizen, was unconstitutional because it discriminated against
citizen children of ineligible aliens, depriving them of the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Four justices concurred, in two separate opinions,- on the broader
ground that the entire Alien Land Law was unconstitutional be-
cause it was in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. They also
declared that it was inconsistent with the obligations of the United
States under article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter. -
Although the Oyama case did not invalidate the California Alien
Land Law, it was used as a means of invalidating a similar Oregon
law,"' in the case of Namba v. McCourt.1 In this case the Oregon
Supreme Court held that state's Alien Land Law unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court acknowledged that the Oyama
case had not overruled the prior decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, but, after an extended review of the majority and
concurring opinions concluded that it limited their application bf
requiring a closer, more critical, scrutiny of state laws which dis-
criminate against aliens. The Court declared that discrimination
334 U. S. 410 (1948).
22 Mr. Justice Black, id. at 420.
23 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
1 United States v. Wong Kim Ark.. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § 1.
332 U.S. 633, 647-74 (1948).
" See id. at 649-50 and 673 for statements as to the United Nations Charter.
27 Ore. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 61-101 to 61-106, 61-108 to 61-111 (1940): Oregon
Laws 1945, Chapter 436, §§ 1 and 2.
' 185 Ore. 579, 204 F.2d 569 (1949).
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against the small and diminishing class of aliens ineligible to citizen-
ship was related to no reasonable purpose of the state, and was there-
fore invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also de-
clared that such discrimination was inconsistent with the obligations
of the United States under Article 55 (c) of the United Nations Char-
ter.'
While the courts in the Namba and Oyama cases recognized the
binding forces of Article 55(c), the California court in the Fujii
case appears to be the first to base a decision entirely on that Article.
However, the High Court of Ontario, Canada, in the case of Re Drum-
mond Wren." appears to be the first to have given it legal effect, as
one of several bases four invalidating a restrictive covenant against
the sale of land "to Jews or persons of objectionable nationality.'
Clearly, then, the Charter has more content than a mere Utopian
dream.
And, as a treaty of the United States, it is a very effective means of
circumventing the police power of the states, which has been re-
garded as a qualification on the Fourteenth Amendment in the
sense that it defines the boundaries of the application of that Amend-
ment. A treaty is not subject to that qualification.'2 A treaty is, with-
out qualification, "the supreme law of the land;... anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."'
Consequently, by the decision of the California court in the rujii case,
based on the supremacy of the United Nations Charter as a treaty,
the Achilles' heel of state alien land laws has at last been discovered.'
- 204 P.2d at 579.
0 (1945) Ont. R. 778, (1945) 4 D.L.R. 674 (Ont. H. C.), 59 Harv. L. Rev.
803 (1946).
31 "I have always felt Re Drummond Wren to be a landmark case in the legal
order of the entire world, and one that should always be held in honor." Sayre,
Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 2 (1948); see Sayrp,
United Nations Law, 25 Can. B. Rev. 810, 821 (1947).
'. Missouri v. -lollani, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); Rottschaefhr, American
Constitutional Law 382-86 (1939).
33 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. (Italics supplied.)
, The American Bar Association Committee for Peace and Law Through United
Nations, re-'"zing the great significance of the decision, fears that if affirmed it
"will furnish a treaty basis without need of any other constitutional sanction, for
claiming invalidation of state laws that make any distinction or classification on
account of sex, race, color..." Report of Committee for Peace and Law Through
United Nations 21 (American Bar Association, Sept. 1, 1950). The-Committee recom-
mends study of the question whether the Constitution should be amended so that
no treaty shall be the supreme law of the land until Congress first passes enabling!
legislation. Id. at 1 and 24. The desirability of such an amendment is highly question-
able, since it would render the conduct of international relations more difficult at a
time when greater co-operation among nations is essential.
